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Abstract
An allocation rule is called Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, if there exists a payment
rule, such that truthful reports of agents’ types form a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct
revelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule and the payment rule. This paper
provides characterizations of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible allocation rules in social
choice settings where agents have one-dimensional or multi-dimensional types, quasi-linear
utility functions and interdependent valuations. The characterizations are derived by
constructing complete directed graphs on agents’ type spaces with cost of manipulation
as lengths of edges. Weak monotonicity of the allocation rule corresponds to the condition
that all 2-cycles in these graphs have non-negative length.
For one-dimensional types and agents’ valuation functions satisfying non-decreasing
expected differences, we show that weak monotonicity of the allocation rule is a necessary
and sufficient condition for the rule to be Bayes-Nash incentive compatibile. In the case
where types are multi-dimensional and the valuation for each outcome is a linear function
in the agent’s type, we show that weak monotonicity of the allocation rule together with
an integrability condition is a necessary and sufficient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility.
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1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatible al-
location rules in social choice settings where agents have independently distributed, one-
dimensional or multi-dimensional types and quasi-linear utility functions, that is, utility is
the valuation of an allocation minus a payment. We allow for interdependent valuations across
agents. The central task addressed in this paper is the following: given such type distributions
and valuations, characterize precisely those allocation rules for which there exists a payment
rule such that truthful reporting of agent’s types forms a Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the direct
revelation mechanism consisting of the allocation rule combined with the payment rule. In
addition, we aim for a framework that lets us construct a payment rule, if any, which makes a
particular allocation rule Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. For example, given an allocation
rule which decides in a combinatorial auction for each set of bids for each agent which set of
items he wins, we want to be able to decide whether there exists a pricing scheme for winning
bids that makes truthful bidding a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. If the answer is yes, we would
like to have means to construct such a pricing scheme.
1.1 Related Work
A recent stream of literature offers examples of characterizing dominant strategy incentive
compatible allocation rules in terms of a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule, see e.g.
Bikhchandani, Chatterji & Sen [2] and Lavi, Mu’alem & Nisan [8]. Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [3]
extend these results to larger classes of preference domains by making a link to network theory.
The most general results are by Saks & Yu [15], who show that previous results extend to
any convex multi-dimensional type space. An allocation rule is dominant strategy incentive
compatible, if there exists a payment rule such that for any report of the other agents an
agent maximizes his own utility by reporting truthfully his type.
The environment considered by Saks & Yu [15] features quasi-linear utilities and multi-
dimensional types. The allocation rule maps agents’ type reports into a finite set ofm possible
outcomes. An agent’s type is a vector in Rm reflecting his valuation of the different possible
outcomes, that is, the agent’s valuation of some outcome a is given by the ath element of
his type vector. Agents’ type spaces are assumed to be convex. Saks & Yu [15] show that
dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules in this setting can be characterized
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in terms of weak monotonicity, a term introduced by Lavi, Mu’alem & Nisan [8]. In order to
derive this result they construct complete directed graphs in the following way: Take some
agent and fix a profile of type reports for the others. Now, a directed graph is constructed
by associating a node with each outcome and putting a directed edge between each ordered
pair of nodes. Take two outcomes a and b. Consider the difference of the valuation of a and
the valuation of b with respect to every type for which truthfully reporting this type yields
outcome a. The length of the network edge from a to b is defined as the infimum of all these
differences. In this fashion a graph is constructed for every agent and every possible report
profile of the other agents. Weak monotonicity states that for any two different outcomes a
and b, the sum of the two edge lengths from a to b and from b to a is non-negative.
Earlier, Rochet [12] characterized dominant strategy implementation in cases where the
set of outcomes is not necessarily finite; an assumption that is crucial to the work of Saks &
Yu [15]. For the case where agents have one-dimensional, convex type spaces and their valu-
ation functions satisfy the increasing differences property, Rochet [12] shows that dominant
strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of a monotonicity condition on
the allocation rule alone. Next, he considers a setting where agents have multi-dimensional,
convex type spaces and valuation functions which are linear w.r.t. their own true types. Tak-
ing some additional differentiability assumptions, Rochet [12] shows that in this case dominant
strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of a monotonicity condition on
the allocation rule plus an integrability condition.
Monotonicity has also been used to characterize Bayes-Nash incentive compatible alloca-
tion rules. Malakhov & Vohra [10] consider an auction setting where multiple units of an
indivisible good are auctioned off to several agents with constant marginal valuations. The
one-dimensional type of an agent is his marginal valuation. Each agent has a finite set of
possible types. Agents do not have interdependent valuations. Malakhov & Vohra [10] show
that Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility holds if and only if the allocation rule is monotone.
Myerson [11] gives such a characterization for a single-item auction setting where agents have
one-dimensional, convex type spaces and interdependent valuations.
Jehiel, Moldovanu & Stacchetti [5] and Jehiel & Moldovanu [4] develop characterizations
for social choice settings where agents have multi-dimensional, convex type spaces and valua-
tion functions which are linear w.r.t. their true types. Their characterizations of Bayes-Nash
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incentive compatibility include a monotonicity condition on the allocation rule as well as an
integrability condition comparable to the one presented by Rochet [12].
1.2 Our Contribution
Similar to the network approach of Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [3] and Saks & Yu [15] we construct
graphs. If an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, then there exists a payment
rule such that an agent’s expected utility for truthfully reporting his type t is at least as high
as his expected utility for misreporting some type s. Similarly, an agent’s expected utility
for truthfully reporting type s is at least as high as his expected utility for misreporting
type t. From combining these two conditions we get a weak monotonicity condition on the
allocation rule. This condition is the expected utility equivalent of the monotonicity condition
mentioned in the context of dominant strategy incentive compatible allocation rules. Weak
monotonicity is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. It expresses
that the expected gain in valuation for truthfully reporting t instead of misreporting s should
be at least as big as the expected gain in valuation for misreporting t instead of truthfully
reporting s.
Recognizing that the constraints inherent in the definition of Bayes-Nash incentive com-
patibility have a natural network interpretation we build complete directed graphs for agents’
type spaces. To do so we associate a node with each type and put a directed edge between
each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge going from the node associated with type
s to the node associated with the type t is defined as the cost of manipulation, that is, the
expected difference in an agent’s valuation for truthfully reporting t instead of misreporting
s. Note that unlike the network approach of Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [3] and Saks & Yu [15]
(see description above) we construct only one graph for each agent since we work in terms
of expectations and do not consider each possible type profile of the other agents separately.
Furthermore, each of these graphs contains (except for the case of finite type spaces) an infi-
nite number of nodes as we associate a node with each possible type of the agent. One could
also construct outcome based graphs (as done by Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [3] and Saks & Yu [15])
by associating a node with each possible probability distribution over outcomes. However,
these graphs possibly also contain an infinite number of nodes since we allow that the different
possible type reports of an agent induce an infinite number of probability distributions over
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outcomes. For example, in the single-item auction framework presented in Section 4 it is
quite natural to allow that every different type report of an agent yields a different expected
conditional probability for him to win the object.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we state some basic assumptions and
definitions. Throughout the paper we assume that agents have quasi-linear utility functions
and independently distributed, privately known types. Furthermore, we allow for interdepen-
dent valuations. We do not put any restrictions on the number of possible outcomes.
In Section 3 we show that an allocation rule is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and
only if the graphs described above contain no finite, negative length cycles. Rochet [12] shows
that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized in terms of the absence of
finite, negative length cycles in similar graphs. Our result is the Bayes-Nash equivalent for his
finding. Furthermore, we show as a lemma that the costs of manipulation are decomposition
monotone if the allocation rule satisfies weak monotonicity and agents’ valuation functions
satisfy non-decreasing expected differences (definitions can be found in Section 2). Using
this result we can fold the aforementioned auction settings of Myerson [11] and Malakhov &
Vohra [10] into the framework presented in Section 4.
In Section 4 agents’ types are restricted to be one-dimensional. No further restrictions on
agents’ type spaces are made, that is, we allow for infinite type spaces as considered by My-
erson [11] as well as for finite type spaces as considered by Malakhov & Vohra [10]. Without
any additional restrictions this setting is too general in order for weak monotonicity to be a
sufficient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. This is illustrated by an exam-
ple. However, for the case that the costs of manipulation are assumed to be decomposition
monotone we are able to show that weak monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition
for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Using the lemma from the foregoing section it fol-
lows that weak monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive
compatibility for the case that agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected
differences. The auction settings considered by Myerson [11] and Malakhov & Vohra [10] are
special cases of this framework. Compared to their settings, our one-dimensional framework
allows not only for a broader class of type spaces but also for alternative forms of interde-
pendencies between agents valuations. This is illustrated at the end of Section 5. Using
the Myerson [11] setting we illustrate how payments can be constructed using the network
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approach.
In Section 5 the case of multi-dimensional types is considered. Agents’ type spaces are
assumed to be convex and their valuation functions are assumed to be linear w.r.t. to their
own true types. Even under these restrictions, weak monotonicity alone is not sufficient for
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility, which is again illustrated by an example. However, we
show that weak monotonicity together with an integrability condition is both necessary and
sufficient for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. Using examples it is illustrated that weak
monotonicity and the integrability condition do not imply each other. The setting of a single-
item auction with externalities considered by Jehiel, Moldovanu & Stacchetti [5] and the
social choice setting considered by Jehiel & Moldovanu [4] are special cases of the framework
presented in this section. Compared to their settings, our multi-dimensional framework allows
for a broader class of possible interdependencies between agents valuations. This is illustrated
at the end of the section.
The main contribution of this paper is thus to derive for the settings described above
a complete characterization of Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility in terms of weak mono-
tonicity and, where necessary, additional properties. Thereby we achieve characterizations
that depend purely on the valuations and the allocation rule. The characterizations resemble
the ones derived by Rochet [12] for dominant strategy incentive compatibility. However, our
results do not follow from Rochet immediately, as we cover broader classes of type spaces and
interdependent valuations.
2 The Model & Basic Definitions
There is a set of agents N = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i has a type ti ∈ T i with T i ⊆ Rk. T
denotes the set of all type profiles t =
(
t1, . . . , tn
)
, and T−i denotes the set of all type profiles
t−i =
(
t1, . . . , ti−1, ti+1, . . . , tn
)
. A payment rule is a function
P : T 7→ Rn,
so given a report profile r−i of the others, reporting a type ri results in a payment Pi
(
ri, r−i
)
for agent i. Denoting the set of outcomes by Γ, an allocation rule is a function
f : T 7→ Γ.
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We allow for interdependent valuations across agents, that is, agents’ valuations do not
only depend on their own types but on the types of all agents. As an example one can think
of an auction for a painting (see Klemperer [6]) where agents’ types reflect how much they like
the painting. An agent’s valuation for owning the painting depends on the types of the others
as they affect the possible resale value of the painting and the owner’s prestige. Take agent
i having true type ti and reporting ri while the others have true types t−i and report r−i.
The value that agent i assigns to the resulting allocation is denoted by vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
.
Utilities are quasi-linear, that is, an agent’s utility is his valuation of an allocation minus his
payment.
Agents’ types are independently distributed. Let pii denote the density on T i. The joint
density pi−i on T−i is then given by
pi−i
(
t−i
)
=
∏
j∈N
j 6=i
pij
(
tj
)
.
Assume that agent i believes all other agents to report truthfully. If agent i has true type
ti, then his expected utility1 for making a report ri is given by
U i(ri | ti) =
∫
T−i
(
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
))
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (1)
We assume E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
to be finite ∀ri, ti ∈ T i.
An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if there exists a payment rule P
such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
. (2)
Symmetrically, we have also
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
. (3)
By adding (2) and (3) we get the following monotonicity condition:2
1The definition of expected utility is only given for the continuous case. However, in Section 4 we also allow
for discrete type spaces. In the discrete case the integral is replaced by a sum.
2Expected payments cancel since we work under the assumption of independently distributed types.
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Definition 1 (Weak Monotonicity) An allocation rule f satisfies weak monotonicity if
∀i ∈ N and ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i:
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| r˜i, t−i
)]
.
This condition is the expected utility equivalent to the weak monotonicity (W-MON) condi-
tion of Lavi, Mu’alem & Nisan [8], the non-decreasing in marginal utility condition (NDMU)
of Bikhchandani, Chatterji & Sen [2] and the 2-cycle inequality of Gui, Mu¨ller & Vohra [3].
Obviously, weak monotonicity is a necessary condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibil-
ity. In the following sections we present settings where weak monotonicity is also a sufficient
condition or where it is sufficient together with an integrability condition.
Furthermore, let us introduce the following condition for agents’ valuation functions:
Definition 2 (Non-decreasing Expected Differences) Take ri, r˜i, ti, t˜i ∈ T i such that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t˜i, t−i
)]
.
The valuation function satisfies non-decreasing expected differences if ∀t¯i ∈ T i s.t.
t¯i = (1− α)t˜i + αti, α > 1 we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t¯i, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
.
This condition deals with the marginal change in expected valuation with respect to the
report. Consider the change in expected valuation for making a report ri instead of r˜i.
Assume that there exist types ti and t˜i such that this change is larger or at least as large if
the agent has true type ti instead of t˜i. Now consider the agent having a true type which is
even further away from t˜i than ti (in the direction of ti). The condition then requires that
the change in expected valuation is at least as large as in the case where the agent has true
type ti. This requirement is comparable to the condition known as increasing (or isotone)
differences which asserts that the marginal change in valuation with respect to the allocation
is increasing in the type.
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3 A Network Interpretation
We begin this section by briefly reviewing a well-known result from the field of network flow
theory.3 Let X = {x1, . . . , xk} be a finite set of variables. Consider the following system of
constraints:
xi − xj ≤ wij ∀i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, (4)
where wij is some constant specific to the ordered pair (i, j). The system can be associated
with a network by constructing a directed, weighted graph whose nodes correspond to the
variables. A directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. The length of the edge
from the node corresponding to xi to the node corresponding to xj is given by wij .
It is a well-known result (see e.g. Shostak [16]) that the system of linear inequalities in
(4) is feasible, that is, there exists an assignment of real values to the variables such that the
constraints in (4) are satisfied, if and only if there is no negative length cycle in the associated
network. Furthermore, if the system is feasible then one feasible solution is to assign to each
xi the length of a shortest path from some arbitrary source node to the node associated with
xi.
In order to see that the constraints in (2) have a natural network interpretation it is useful
to rewrite (2) as follows:
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (5)
Considering a specific allocation rule, the right-hand side of (5) is a constant. Thus, we have
a system of difference constraints as described in (4) (except that we are now dealing with a
potentially infinite number of variables).
Given this observation, we associate the system of inequalities with a network in the same
way as is described above. For each agent we build a complete directed graph T if . A node is
associated with each type and a directed edge is put between each ordered pair of nodes. For
agent i the length of an edge directed from ri to r˜i is denoted li(ri, r˜i) and is defined as the
cost of manipulation:
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
. (6)
3A comprehensive introduction to network flows can be found in Ahuja, Magnanti & Orlin [1].
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For technical reasons we allow for loops. However, note that an edge directed from ri to ri
has length li(ri, ri) = 0.
Using this definition of the edge lengths, the weak monotonicity condition can be written
as
li
(
ri, r˜i
)
+ li
(
r˜i, ri
)
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i.
So weak monotonicity corresponds to the absence of negative length 2-cycles in the graphs
described above.
Rochet [12] observed that dominant strategy incentive compatibility can be characterized
in terms of the absence of finite, negative length cycles in similar graphs. Using the same
proof technique, we can derive such a characterization for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
as well.
Theorem 1 An allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if there is
no finite, negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N .
Proof (Adapted from Rochet [12].)
Take some agent i and let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . Let us
assume that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. This implies, using (5) and the edge length
definition (6), that for every j ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
E−i
[
Pi
(
rij , t
−i
)
− Pi
(
rij+1, t
−i
)]
≤ li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
.
Adding up these inequalities yields
0 ≤
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
so C has non-negative length.
Conversely, let us assume that there exists no finite, negative length cycle in T if , ∀i ∈ N .
For each agent i we pick an arbitrary source node ri0 ∈ T
i and define ∀ri ∈ T i
pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
where the infimum is taken over all finite paths A = {ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = r
i
0} in T
i
f , that is,
all finite paths that start at ri and end at ri0. Absence of finite, negative length cycles implies
that pi
(
ri0
)
= 0. Furthermore, ∀ri ∈ T i we have
pi
(
ri0
)
≤ pi
(
ri
)
+ li
(
ri0, r
i
)
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which implies that pi
(
ri
)
is finite. For every pair ri, r˜i ∈ T i we also have
pi
(
ri
)
≤ pi
(
r˜i
)
+ li
(
ri, r˜i
)
.
Thus, by setting4 Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
= pi
(
ri
)
, ∀t−i ∈ T−i, and using (6) we get
E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)
− Pi
(
r˜i, t−i
)]
≤ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Hence, the constraints in (5) are satisfied and f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
2
Let us conclude this section with a condition for the costs of manipulation that is used in
the derivation of the characterization theorems presented in the following sections.
Definition 3 (Decomposition Monotonicity) The costs of manipulation are decomposi-
tion monotone if ∀ri, r¯i ∈ T i and ∀ri ∈ T i s.t. ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i, α ∈ (0, 1) we have
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
.
So looking at a pair of nodes, if decomposition monotonicity holds then the direct edge between
those nodes is at least as long as any path connecting the same two nodes via nodes lying
on the line segment between them. Figure 1 gives an illustrative example. Decomposition
monotonicity implies that the edge from ri to r¯i is at least as long as the path A = {ri, ri∗∗, r¯
i}}
and that A is at least as long as the path A˜ = {ri, ri∗, r
i
∗∗, r
i
∗∗∗, r¯
i}}.
ri r¯iri∗ r
i
∗∗ r
i
∗∗∗
Figure 1: Decomposition monotonicity.
Weak monotonicity and non-decreasing expected differences together imply that the costs
of manipulation are decomposition monotone:
4Note that it is sufficient to set E−i
[
Pi
(
ri, t−i
)]
= pi
(
ri
)
+ c. This allows for a variety of payment rules
yielding the same expected payments up to an additive constant.
11
Lemma 1 If f satisfies weak monotonicity and the valuation function satisfies non-decreasing
expected differences then the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.
Proof
Take some agent i and let ri, r¯i ∈ T i. Let ri ∈ T i such that ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i for some
α ∈ (0, 1). Weak monotonicity implies that
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
.
Since the valuation function satisfies non-decreasing expected differences we have
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Adding E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
on both sides of the later in-
equality yields
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Notice that the first and the last term on the left-hand side of the inequality cancel, hence
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
≥ E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
+E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)]
.
Using (6) this can be written as
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
,
so the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone.
2
12
4 One-Dimensional Types
In this section we consider the one-dimensional case where T i ⊆ R. For this setting we
can show that weak monotonicity is not only a necessary but also a sufficient condition for
Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility if decomposition monotonicity is satisfied.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the allocation rule f and agents’ valuation functions are such that
the costs of manipulation satisfy decomposition monotonicity. Then, f is Bayes-Nash incen-
tive compatible if and only if f satisfies weak monotonicity.
Proof
As mentioned in Section 2, the necessity of weak monotonicity follows trivially. For the other
direction note that weak monotonicity corresponds to the absence of negative length 2-cycles
in T if , ∀i ∈ N (see Section 3). In order to establish sufficiency, we show that this implies that
there does not exist any finite cycle with negative length. Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility
then follows from Theorem 1.
Take some agent i and let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . When-
ever an edge of C connects two non-neighboring nodes, we substitute this edge with a path
connecting the same two nodes via edges that have the same direction and only connect
neighboring nodes. By doing this we generate a new cycle C˜ that has the same nodes as C
but consists only of edges between neighboring nodes, see for example Figure 2.
Decomposition monotonicity implies that the length of C is larger than or equal to the
length of C˜. Since C˜ is a cycle, we know that at each node the number of edges entering
equals the number of edges leaving. This implies that the length of C˜ can be written as the
sum of 2-cycle lengths. Since there are no negative length 2-cycles, it follows that C has
non-negative length.
2
C C˜
Figure 2: The original cycle C and the newly generated cycle C˜.
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If agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected differences we can state
directly the following:
Theorem 3 Suppose that agents’ valuation functions satisfy non-decreasing expected differ-
ences. Then, the allocation rule f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if f satisfies
weak monotonicity.
Proof
Again, the necessity of weak monotonicity follows trivially (see Section 2). In order to establish
sufficiency, note that weak monotonicity together with non-decreasing expected differences
implies that the costs of manipulation are decomposition monotone, see Lemma 1. Finally
apply Theorem 2.
2
Note that weak monotonicity might not be sufficient for Bayes-Nash incentive compati-
bility if the cost of manipulation are not decomposition monotone, as we illustrate with the
following example:
Example 1 For simplicity we assume that there exists only a single agent. His type space
T = {x, y, z} consists of three types x, y, z ∈ R, for which we assume x < y < z. There are
three possible outcomes, specifically Γ = {a, b, c}. The agent values the different outcomes,
depending on his type, according to the following valuation matrix V :
x y z
a 2 0 3
b 3 2 0
c 0 3 2
The allocation rule f is defined as follows: f(x) = a, f(y) = b, f(z) = c. So if the agent
reports truthfully his type, the allocation rule assigns his second most preferred outcome. The
corresponding network Tf is depicted in Figure 3.
Decomposition monotonicity is not satisfied since l(z, x) < l(z, y) + l(y, x). As easily can
be checked, all 2-cycles have length 1, so weak monotonicity is satisfied. However, the 3-cycle
C = {x, y, z, x} has length l(x,y)+l(y,z)+l(z,x)=-3. The existence of such a negative length
cycle implies that f is not Bayes-Nash incentive compatible (see Theorem 1).
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x y z
-1
-1 -1
2
2 2
Figure 3: The network Tf in Example 1.
4.1 Application to Single-item Auctions
As a special case let us consider a single-item auction. Specifically, we look at a setting
introduced by Myerson [11]. In this setting a single, indivisible object is auctioned off to one
of several agents. An agent’s type reflects his initial value estimate for the object. We assume
that T i =
[
ai, bi
]
with −∞ < ai < bi <∞. Given reports from all agents, the allocation rule
f : T 7→ [0, 1]n assigns to each agent a probability for winning the object. So the outcome
set Γ is the set of all possible winning probability profiles. Agent i’s probability to win, given
a report profile t ∈ T , is denoted f i(t). The allocation rule must satisfy the probability
conditions
∑n
i=1 f
i(t) ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ f i(t) ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ N, ∀t ∈ T .
Agents’ valuations are assumed to be interdependent. If an agent would get to know the
value estimate of some other agent, he would want to revise his own initial value estimate
for the object. For instance, the object is a painting (see also example in Section 2) and the
agent is uncertain about whether he is dealing with an original or a forgery. Learning that
another agent has a low value estimate, suggesting a tendency towards forgery, would incline
him to revise his own value estimate downwards. We assume that agents make these revisions
additively according to n revision effect functions ej : T j 7→ R, j ∈ N : if agent i learns that
agent j has type tj , he revises his initial value estimate by adding ej
(
tj
)
to it.5 In order
5Modelling the valuation interdependencies in this way implies that actually all agents i 6= j would revise
their initial estimates by the same amount ej
(
tj
)
. Without affecting any of the results, one could also allow
for agent specific adjustments by assuming that each agent i has n − 1 revision effect functions eji : T
j 7→ R,
j ∈ N , j 6= i.
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to justify that an agent’s type reflects his initial value estimate for the object, we assume in
addition that ∫
T j
ej
(
tj
)
pij
(
tj
)
dtj = 0,
that is, revision effects have an expected value of zero.6
Take agent i having true type ti and reporting ri while the others have true types t−i and
reports r−i. The value that this agent assigns to the resulting allocation is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
=
(
ti +
∑
j∈N
j 6=i
ej
(
tj
))
f i
(
ri, r−i
)
.
Assuming that agent i believes that the others report truthfully, his expected conditional
probability to win the object if reporting ri is
qi
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
f i
(
ri, t−i
)
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i (7)
and his expected valuation is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= tiqi
(
ri
)
+
∫
T−i
(∑
j∈N
j 6=i
ej
(
tj
))
f i
(
ri, t−i
)
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i. (8)
Using (8), the weak monotonicity condition becomes
(
ri − r˜i
) (
qi
(
ri
)
− qi
(
r˜i
))
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i. (9)
Myerson [11] shows that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and
only if (9) is satisfied and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri ∈ T i,
where U i
(
ri | ri
)
denotes agent i’s expected utility (see (1) for definition) for truthfully re-
porting ri.
As one can easily verify, agents’ valuation functions in this single-item auction setting
satisfy non-decreasing expected differences. Thus, we can directly apply the results derived
earlier in this section. From Theorem 3 it follows that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
if and only if the weak monotonicity condition in (9) is satisfied.
6The stated results do not depend on this assumption. However, without it, the interpretation of agents’
types would change.
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As described in the proof of Theorem 1, corresponding payments can be constructed by
using shortest path lengths. For each i ∈ N , let us pick ai as the source node in T if . Thus, if
agent i reports ri, he has to make a payment
Pi
(
ri
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
, (10)
where the infimum is taken over all finite paths A =
{
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim+1 = a
i
}
in T if , that is,
all finite paths from ri to ai. Considering the length of such a finite path, rewriting yields
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
=
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim, t
−i
)]
−
m−1∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri1, t
−i
)
| ri1, t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
−
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
m∑
j=1
(
rij − r
i
j+1
)
qi
(
rij+1
)
.
The first equality follows from the definition of the edge length given in (6). The second
equality follows from rearranging the terms of the summation. The third equality is derived
by adding and subtracting E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rim+1, t
−i
)
| rim+1, t
−i
)]
. To derive the last equality we
use (8) and that ri1 = r
i, rim+1 = a
i.
Weak monotonicity implies that qi(ri) is Riemann integrable.7 Furthermore, since the
valuation function satisfies non-decreasing expected differences, decomposition monotonicity
is satisfied (see Lemma 1). So considering any finite path A in T if connecting r
i and ai, we
can construct paths that are shorter (or as long) by letting them visit the same nodes as A
and also additional nodes inbetween (see also example in Figure 1). In the limit, as m→∞,
the distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero and
m∑
j=1
(
rij − r
i
j+1
)
qi
(
rij+1
)
→
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds.
7This result can be found in any advanced analysis textbook, e.g. Maak [9].
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Applying the above to (10) yields
Pi
(
ri
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds, (11)
implying that the expected utility for truthfully reporting ri is8
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ri
ai
qi(s)ds. (12)
5 Multi-Dimensional Types
In this section we consider the multi-dimensional case where T i ⊆ Rk.9 We assume that T i
is convex for each agent i. Furthermore, we now assume that an agent’s valuation function
is linear in his own true type. So if agent i has true type ti and reports ri while the others
have true types t−i and reports r−i, his valuation for the resulting allocation is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
= αi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| t−i
)
+ βi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| t−i
)
ti. (13)
Note that αi : Γ×T−i 7→ R and βi : Γ×T−i 7→ Rk, i.e. αi assigns to every
(
γ, t−i
)
∈ Γ×T−i
a value in R, whereas βi assigns to every
(
γ, t−i
)
∈ Γ×T−i a value in Rk. Similarly, assuming
he believes all other agents to report truthfully, agent i’s expected valuation for reporting ri
while having true type ti is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
= E−i
[
αi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
+ E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
ti. (14)
Using (14), the weak monotonicity condition becomes
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)
− βi
(
f
(
r˜i, t−i
)
| t−i
)] (
ri − r˜i
)
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i.
One can easily verify that the linear valuation function described above satisfies non-
decreasing expected differences. For this case we showed in Section 4 that weak monotonicity
is a sufficient condition for Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility if agents’ type spaces are one-
dimensional (see Theorem 3). Unfortunately, if type spaces are multi-dimensional then weak
monotonicity alone is not sufficient anymore, as is illustrated in Example 2.
8In order to derive (12) one can use that by construction Pi
(
ai
)
= 0 and thus add this term to the
right-hand side of (11).
9In the special case where agents’ type spaces are subsets of lines in Rk, the results of the foregoing section
go through unchanged.
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This example is constructed based on the following insight: Suppose that the allocation
function f and the mapping βi are such that we can write
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
= riBi,
where Bi is some agent specific k × k matrix. Weak monotonicity requires
(
ri − r˜i
)
Bi
(
ri − r˜i
)′
≥ 0 ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i,
where ′ denotes “transposed”. Note that
Bi =
1
2
(
Bi +B
′
i
)
+
1
2
(
Bi −B
′
i
)
,
that is, Bi can be decomposed into a symmetric part
1
2
(Bi +B
′
i) and an anti-symmetric part
1
2
(Bi −B
′
i). Weak monotonicity is already satisfied if the symmetric part of Bi is positive
semi-definite. However, there are no finite, negative length cycles in T if (and thus f is Bayes-
Nash incentive compatible) if and only if Bi is symmetric and positive semi-definite (follows
from Rockafellar [14], p.240).
Example 2 For simplicity we assume that there exists only a single agent. His type space
T = conv{x, y, z} with generic element t = (tx, ty, tz) is the convex hull of the three unit
vectors in R3, i.e. a simplex with vertices x = (1, 0, 0), y = (0, 1, 0) and z = (0, 0, 1).
There are three elementary outcomes, denoted a, b and c. The allocation function f maps
every report into a probability distribution over these three outcomes. Thus, the outcome
space Γ is the set of all possible probability distributions on {a, b, c}. The generic element γ =
(γa, γb, γc) indicates that outcome a is achieved with probability γa, b with probability γb and c
with probability γc. The elementary outcomes can be associated with the three unit vectors in
R
3, i.e. a = (1, 0, 0), b = (0, 1, 0) and c = (0, 0, 1). Specifically, we take f to be simply a linear
mapping corresponding to the 3 × 3 identity matrix I. Hence, f(t) = tI = (tx, ty, tz) and
Γ = conv{a, b, c}. So reporting t results in outcome a being realized with probability tx, b with
probability ty and c with probability tz. Since there is only one agent, the general valuation
function in (14) becomes v(f(r) | t) = α(f(r)) + β(f(r))t. Specifically, we set α(γ) equal to
zero for all γ ∈ Γ, and we let β be a linear mapping corresponding to the matrix V given in
Example 1. Thus, v(f(r) | t) = f(r)V t′ = rV t′.
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As easily can be checked (by verifying that the symmetric part 1
2
(V + V ′) of V is positive
definite), weak monotonicity is satisfied, that is, (r − r˜)V (r − r˜)′ ≥ 0, ∀r, r˜ ∈ T . Neverthe-
less, the 3-cycle C = {x, y, z, x} has length l(x,y)+l(y,z)+l(z,x)=-3 (see also Figure 4). The
existence of such a negative length cycle implies that f is not Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
(see Theorem 1).
y
z
x
T
-1
-1
-1
Figure 4: The negative cycle C in Example 2.
From the above example it is evident that weak monotonicity alone is not enough to
ensure Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility. However, in the following we are going to show
that weak monotonicity together with an integrability condition is sufficient.
Definition 4 (Path Independence) Let ψ: T i 7→ Rk be a vector field. ψ is called path
independent if for any two ri, r¯i ∈ T i the integral of ψ from ri to r¯i
∫ r¯i
ri,S
ψ
is independent of the path of integration S.
Note that E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is a vector field T i 7→ Rk.
Theorem 4 Suppose that every agent i has a convex type space and a valuation function
which is linear in his true type. Then the following statements are equivalent:
1) f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible.
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2) f satisfies weak monotonicity and for every agent i, E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is path in-
dependent.
Proof
(1)⇒(2): Let us assume that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 2, the necessity of weak monotonicity follows trivially. Furthermore, from Theorem
1 it follows that for every agent i the graph T if has no finite, negative length cycles. Let
C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . Absence of finite, negative length
cycles implies that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥ 0
which can be rewritten using (6) and (14) as
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| t−i
)
− βi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| t−i
)]
rij ≥ 0.
This implies that
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| t−i
)] (
rij+1 − r
i
j
)
≥ 0.
Thus, E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is cyclically monotone.10 From Rockafellar [14], Theorem
24.8, it follows that there exists a convex function ϕ: T i 7→ R such that E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is a selection from its subdifferential mapping, that is,
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
∈ ∂ϕ
(
ri
)
,∀ri ∈ T i.
This implies (see Krishna & Maenner [7], Theorem 1) that for any smooth path S in T i
joining ri and r¯i the following holds:
∫ r¯i
ri,S
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
= ϕ
(
r¯i
)
− ϕ
(
ri
)
,
so E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is path independent.
(2)⇒(1): Let us assume that f satisfies weak monotonicity and that for every agent i,
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
is path independent. Take any edge from T if and denote its starting
node ri and its ending node r¯i. Let L denote the line segment between ri and r¯i, i.e. L ={
ri ∈ T i | ri = (1− α)ri + αr¯i, α ∈ [0, 1]
}
. Now we pick any ri ∈ L and substitute the original
10The notion of cyclical monotonicity was introduced by Rockafellar [13].
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edge with the path A =
{
ri, ri, r¯i
}
which has length li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
. As mentioned
above, the valuation function satisfies non-decreasing expected differences. Together with
weak monotonicity this implies (see Lemma 1):
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥ li
(
ri, ri
)
+ li
(
ri, r¯i
)
, (15)
that is, the original edge is at least as long as the path A. By repeated substitution we can
generate a new path A˜ =
{
ri1 = r
i, . . . , rim, r
i
m+1 = r¯
i
}
where rij ∈ L, ∀j ∈ {1, . . . ,m + 1}.
Then (1) implies that the original edge is at least as long as A˜, that is,
li
(
ri, r¯i
)
≥
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
,
(see also the example given in Figure 1). Note that11
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| t−i
)] (
rij − r
i
j+1
)
.
By repeated substitution we can generate paths with more and more edges. In the limit the
distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero and
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| t−i
)] (
rij − r
i
j+1
)
→
∫ r¯i
ri,L
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
.
Thus, the length of A˜ goes to
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
r¯i, t−i
)
| r¯i, t−i
)]
+
∫ r¯i
ri,L
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
, (16)
asm→∞. Now, let C =
{
ri1, . . . , r
i
m, r
i
m+1 = r
i
1
}
denote a finite cycle in T if . Furthermore, let
Lj denote the line segment between r
i
j and r
i
j+1. The result in (16) and the path independence
11For a more detailed description of the transformation steps involved, the reader is referred to the single-item
auction application in Section 4.
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of E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
imply for the length of C that
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
≥
m∑
j=1
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
+
m∑
j=1
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
= 0,
that is, C has non-negative length. In order to see the equality relation, note the following:
the terms of the first summation cancel each other out. Furthermore, the second summation
describes an integral over a closed path in T i which, due to path independence, equals zero.
2
Weak monotonicity of f and path independence of E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
do not imply
one another. That weak monotonicity does not imply path independence follows directly from
Example 2 and Theorem 4. It can also be derived directly from Example 2. If we consider
for example path A consisting of the line segment between x and y and path A˜ consists of
the line segment between x and z and the line segment between z and y, we find that
∫ y
x,A
β(f(r)) = −
3
2
and
∫ y
x,A˜
β(f(r)) = 3.
So the integral of β(f(r)) from x to y is not independent of the path of integration. That
weak monotonicity of f does not imply path independence of E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
de-
pends crucially upon the assumption of multi-dimensional type spaces. If we would consider
one-dimensional type spaces instead, then weak monotonicity would indeed imply path inde-
pendence. This can be seen for example in the single-item auction application presented in
Section 4.
That path independence does not imply weak monotonicity is illustrated by the following
example.
Example 3 Let us consider the allocation of a single, indivisible object. For simplicity we
assume that there exists only a single agent to possibly allocate to. He has a type t ∈ T = [0, 1]
which reflects the value of the object for him. Given a report r of the agent, the allocation
rule f : T 7→ [0, 1] assigns to him a probability for getting the object. The agent’s valuation
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for the resulting allocation is v(f(r) | t) = f(r)t. Specifically, we set f(r) = −(2r − 1)2 + 1
(see Figure 5). Clearly, f is path independent but not weakly monotone.
r
1
0 1
f(r)
Figure 5: The allocation function in Example 3.
If f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible, the corresponding payments can be constructed
by using shortest path lengths (as described in the proof of Theorem 1). For each i ∈ N ,
let us pick some ai as the source node in T if . Thus, if agent i reports t
i, he has to make a
payment
Pi
(
ti
)
= inf
m∑
j=1
li
(
rij , r
i
j+1
)
, (17)
where the infimum is taken over all finite paths from ti to ai. Take any finite path A ={
ri1 = t
i, . . . , rim+1 = a
i
}
in T if . Let Lj denote the line segment between r
i
j and r
i
j+1, whereas
Lt denotes the line segment between the source and t
i. Following the repeated substitution
approach presented in the second part of the proof of Theorem 4, we can construct paths that
are shorter (or as long) by letting them visit the same nodes as A and also additional nodes
along the line segments inbetween. In the limit, as the number of nodes goes to infinity, the
distance between neighboring nodes goes to zero and the length of the paths goes to
m∑
j=1
(
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
rij , t
−i
)
| rij , t
−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
rij+1, t
−i
)
| rij+1, t
−i
)]
+
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)] )
. (18)
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Using path independence (18) we have that12
m∑
j=1
∫ rij+1
rij ,Lj
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
=
∫ ai
ti,Lt
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
.
Applying the above to (17) yields
Pi
(
ti
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ti, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
∫ ti
ai,Lt
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
, (19)
implying that the expected utility (see (1) for definition) for truthfully reporting ti is13
U i
(
ti | ti
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ti
ai,Lt
E−i
[
βi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| t−i
)]
. (20)
5.1 Application to the Social Choice Model of Jehiel & Moldovanu [4]
As a special case let us consider the social choice model introduced by Jehiel & Moldovanu [4]
which allows for allocative externalities and interdependent valuations.14 In this setting there
exists a set of social alternativesM = {1, . . . ,m}. Given reports from all agents, the allocation
rule f : T 7→ [0, 1]m assigns to each social alternative a probability to be chosen. So the
outcome set Γ is the set of all possible probability profiles. Alternative k’s probability to be
chosen, given a report profile r ∈ T , is denoted fk(r). The allocation rule must satisfy the
probability conditions
∑m
k=1 fk(t) = 1 and 0 ≤ fk(t) ≤ 1, ∀k ∈M,∀t ∈ T .
For every agent i, the type space T i ⊆ Rm×n is assumed to be convex and bounded. Ele-
ment tikj of agent i’s type t
i ∈ T i affects agent j’s valuation for social alternative k ∈M . Agent
i’s valuation for some alternative k ∈M , given a type profile t ∈ T , is vi(k | t) =
∑n
j=1 a
j
kit
j
ki,
where the scalars ajki are common knowledge and a
i
ki ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ N , ∀k ∈M . Let agent i have
true type ti and report ri while the others have true types t−i and reports r−i. His valuation
12The line segment Lt for the path of integration is picked for convenience. Due to path independence, it
can be replaced with any other path connecting the source and ti.
13Again, in order to derive (20) one can use that by construction Pi
(
ai
)
= 0 and thus add this term to the
right-hand side of (19).
14Jehiel, Moldovanu & Stacchetti [5] present a special case of this model without interdependent valuations.
They consider single-item auctions with externalities where agent i has a type ti ∈ T i ⊆ Rn. Type element
tii reflects his valuation for the object, whereas t
i
j reflects the (commonly negative) value of the externalities
agent i incurs if agent j gets the object.
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for the resulting outcome is
vi
(
f
(
ri, r−i
)
| ti, t−i
)
=
m∑
k=1
(
fk
(
ri, r−i
) n∑
j=1
a
j
kit
j
ki
)
.
Assuming that he reports ri and believes that the others report truthfully, his expected
conditional probability for social alternative k ∈M to be chosen is
qik
(
ri
)
=
∫
T−i
fk
(
ri, t−i
)
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
Define Qi
(
ri
)
: T i 7→ Rm×n as the vector field, where, for each k ∈ M , the kith element is
given by aikiq
i
k
(
ri
)
and the kjth element is zero ∀j 6= i. Agent i’s expected valuation, given
report ri and true type ti, is
E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ti, t−i
)]
=
∫
T−i
( m∑
k=1
(
fk
(
ri, t−i
) n∑
j=1
a
j
kit
j
ki
))
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i
= Qi
(
ri
)
ti +
m∑
k=1
∫
T−i
(
fk
(
ri, t−i
)∑
j∈N
j 6=i
a
j
kit
j
ki
)
pi−i
(
t−i
)
dt−i.
(21)
Using (21), the weak monotonicity condition becomes
(
ri − r˜i
) (
Qi
(
ri
)
−Qi
(
r˜i
))
≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i. (22)
Jehiel & Moldovanu [4] show that a mechanism (f, P ) is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible
if and only if (22) holds, Qi is path independent ∀i ∈ N and
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
r˜i | r˜i
)
+
∫ ri
r˜i,S
Qi(s) ∀i ∈ N, ∀ri, r˜i ∈ T i, (23)
where S denotes a path in T i connecting r˜i and ri. Due to path independence, it does not
matter which path of integration is chosen.
Note that in this social choice model an agent’s valuation function is linear in his own
type. Thus, we can directly apply the results derived earlier in this section. From Theorem
4 it follows that f is Bayes-Nash incentive compatible if and only if the weak monotonicity
condition in (22) holds and Qi is path independent ∀i ∈ N . The corresponding payments are
given by (19). Thus, if we let ai denote the source node in T if ,
Pi
(
ri
)
= E−i
[
vi
(
f
(
ri, t−i
)
| ri, t−i
)
− vi
(
f i
(
ai, t−i
)
| ai, t−i
)]
−
∫ ri
ai,S
Qi(s),
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where S denotes a path in T i connecting ai and ri. Due to path independence, it does not
matter which path of integration is chosen. This implies (see also (20)) that the expected
utility for truthfully reporting ri is
U i
(
ri | ri
)
= U i
(
ai | ai
)
+
∫ ri
ai,S
Qi(s),
thus (23) holds.
In this application, as in the single-item auction application presented in Section 4, the
interdependencies with other agents’ types enter an agent’s valuation function only additively
via the α-term in (13). However, note that the class of valuation functions presented in (13)
also allows for interesting settings where the interdependencies with other agents’ types enter
multiplicatively via the β-term. Consider for example the following simple communication
network setting:
Example 4 There exist three agents, N = {1, 2, 3}, each owning a link in the communication
network presented in Figure 6, that is, agent i owns the link li. Furthermore, there exists a
social planner who wants to send data from the point of origin to the destination point. In
order to do so, he can rent different combinations of links. The outcome set Γ contains the
possible link combinations he can choose from, Γ = {∅, {l3}, {l1, l2}, {l1, l2, l3}}. The planner
assigns a value δ to the successful data transfer. Data can only be sent once. If the planner
chooses the link combination {l1, l2, l3}, we assume that the following simple rooting policy is
employed: with probability ρ the upper connection {l1, l2} is used, and with probability 1 − ρ
the lower connection is used.
Each agent has a type ti ∈ [0, 1] reflecting the probability that his link actually works if
the planner tries to send data through it (e.g. it might be busy putting through other data).
Furthermore, agent i incurs fixed, publicly known costs ci for putting data through his link.
His valuation for γ ∈ Γ is vi
(
γ | ti
)
= −ciAi(γ)ti where Ai(γ) denotes the probability that the
data reaches the link li if outcome γ is chosen. The allocation rule of the planner is to pick a
γ ∈ Γ such that [δT (γ)−C(γ)] is maximized. T (γ) denotes the expected throughput, that is, the
probability that the data reaches the destination given the link combination γ. C(γ) denotes the
expected throughput costs, that is,
∑
i c
iAi(γ)ti. The valuations of the agents for the different
outcomes are summarized in Table 1. Note that agent 1’s type enters agent 2’s valuation of
the outcomes {l1, l2} and {l1, l2, l3} in the aforementioned multiplicative fashion. Employing
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different routing policies and data sending strategies, one can construct also examples where
each agent exhibits such interdependent valuations.
origin destination
ρ
(1− ρ)
l1 l2
l3
Figure 6: The communication network considered in Example 4.
γ v1
(
γ | t1
)
v2
(
γ | t2
)
v3
(
γ | t3
)
∅ 0 0 0
{l3} 0 0 −c
3t3
{l1, l2} −c
1t1 −c2t1t2 0
{l1, l2, l3}} −c
1ρt1 −c2ρt1t2 −c3(1− ρ)t3
Table 1: Agents’ valuations in Example 4.
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